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So far, the reforms carried out in the Soviet Union under the slogans of glasnost' and 
perestroika have had a positive impact. If current fears of a restoration of a dictatorship 
are realized, a new system of repression will inevitably have far-reaching consequences 
for the churches. Whereas in earlier years churches were constantly being closed, since 
1988 over 3,000 churches have been reopened. Priests no longer have to register 
baptisms and marriages with the state authorities. As a result, the number of adult 
baptisms has shown an enormous increase. To a limited extent, the churches are now 
permitted to carry out charitable activity. A great number of informal associations linked 
to the churches have been established. The state-controlled media report on church 
events. Church leaders have been elected to the Congresses of People's Deputies. The 
changed attitude toward the church and religion became evident to the world in 
connection with the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the baptism of Kievan Rus' 
in 1988.
A vast experiment appears to be coming to an end. For 70 years, one-sixth of the 
earth's surface and its entire population were officially in the course of being 
transformed in accordance with the "best model" supplied by Marxist-Leninist theory. A 
small group of communist party leaders set the course that the country followed. With 
titanic determination, a new people, a new society, and a new man were to be created. 
For this, Lenin—even before Stalin—was prepared to pay any price. "Use force 
mercilessly in the interest of the final goal of achieving a society in which there will no 
longer be any need for coercion"(1) Lenin's successors carried out this demand 
inexorably, but the final goal moved ever farther away. Since the ideology could point to 
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very few convincing achievements, the planned future acquired more and more 
importance for the justification of the sacrifices required of society. Technological and 
scientific progress became a concept that was revered with religious passion. As a 
result, the catastrophe of Chernobyl meant far more than just a technological disaster. It 
represented the demythologization of a profound eschatological belief. Nuclear power, 
the symbol of a promising future, became an ominous threat.
Lenin had always seen the church as one of his main enemies, opposed to his aims. 
For this reason, he gave orders that the church was to be treated ruthlessly. "The 
greater the number of representatives of the reactionary bourgeoisie and clergy we 
succeed in shooting, the better." (2) Now after 70 years of fury directed against religion 
as the opium of the people and alleged obstacle to progress, the realization is growing 
that: 1) religion cannot be killed; and 2) the Christian religion by virtue of its own self-
perception is an incentive rather than an opiate for the development of society. The 
former chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, Konstantin Kharchev, declared at a 
Moscow meeting with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church on January 12, 
1989, "One must enable human beings and the church to come closer to God. One 
must fill the church with a new spirit, so that it can become a moral and ethical example 
for the people."(3)
No other country possesses as many varieties of Christian practice as the Soviet Union. 
All the four great Christian traditions are represented with their particular cultures: the 
Oriental (the Armenian Apostolic Church), the Orthodox (the Russian Orthodox Church 
and the Georgian Orthodox Church), the Catholic (both the Latin and the Byzantine 
Rites), and the Reformed Churches (Lutherans, Evangelic Christians, Baptists, etc.).
About two-thirds of all Christians in the Soviet Union belong to the Russian Orthodox 
Church, i.e., 50 million out of 75 million believers. Because of the number of its 
adherents, but also because of its organic connection with the Russian people, the 
principal nation of the multinational Soviet state, the Russian Orthodox claims for itself a 
leading role among Soviet Christians. From the beginning, the Russian Orthodox 
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Church bore the main burden of Soviet persecution, but at the same time it was the 
most deeply involved in collaboration with the regime. Russian Orthodox dissidents like 
Father Gleb Yakunin are calling for the church to search its conscience and work to 
overcome the legacy of the past. The Russian Orthodox hierarchy let itself be 
harnessed too uncritically and submissively to the policies of the totalitarian state.
After the Russian Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church with its eight million believers 
is the second largest denomination in the Soviet Union. It is divided into two 
approximately equal parts: 1) Catholics of the Latin Rite centered in the Baltic states; 
and 2) Catholics of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite centered in the Western Ukraine. As a 
result of its history and worldwide importance, the Catholic Church enjoys a significance 
in the eyes of the Soviet regime that is greater than the number of its adherents alone 
would justify. The Catholic Church is the only religious denomination in the Soviet Union 
that requires the Soviet government to enter into international negotiations.
The Ukrainian Catholic Church occupies a special place in the mosaic of church life in 
the Soviet Union. Legally, it should have had no existence between 1946 and 1989. 
Going back to the Union of Brest (1596), under which the Orthodox dioceses of the 
Polish Lithuanian Empire came under the jurisdiction of Rome while preserving the 
Byzantine-Slavonic Rite, the church remained through the centuries the backbone of 
Ukrainian-Ruthenian popular tradition. While the Byzantine Rite protected the 
Ukrainians from polonization, their belonging to the Catholic Church protected them 
from russification.
A synod held in L'vov in March 1946, organized by the Soviet authorities and the 
Russian Orthodox Church, decided to break the connection with Rome and to seek 
union with the Russian Orthodox Church. The year before, the Catholic bishops, 
headed by Metropolitan Josif Slipij, and a large number of priests had been arrested. 
Since that time the Russian Orthodox Church has led an existence outside the law. 
Many bishops and priests perished in the camps. Despite these losses—or precisely 
because of them—the illegally operating Ukrainian Catholic Church exercised a great 
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power of attraction on nationally conscious Ukrainians because of its steadfastness. 
Through secret consecrations it was able constantly to renew its leadership, so that 
today with 10 bishops and about 1,000 priests it represents a significant religious force.
Since Gorbachev's first visit to the Vatican in December 1989, Ukrainian Catholic 
parishes have been able to obtain official registration and thus exist legally. However, 
the status of the church's bishops and the entire leadership of the church remains 
unclear. By the end of 1990, about 1,000 Ukrainian Catholic parishes had been 
registered. A conflict with the Moscow Patriarchate has flared up over church buildings. 
In many places, the elected local soviets have transferred the right of use of the 
churches to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Protests against alleged or actual use of 
force during this process have had no effect.
An additional source of tension has been created by the establishment of the Ukrainian 
Autocephalic Orthodox Church, which has resulted in a reduction of the number of 
churches dependent upon Moscow in the whole of the Ukraine, not only its western 
portion. As a protest against the russification of the Russian Orthodox Church—which 
just last year for reasons of opportunism decided to change its name to the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church—many Orthodox priests are turning away from the Moscow 
Patriarchate. Meanwhile the newly constituted synod has elected the head of the 
Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church Abroad, Metropolitan Mstislav (Skrybnik) of 
Philadelphia, as Patriarch. The Ukrainian authorities have displayed a cooperative 
attitude toward his activity and toward him personally since his arrival in the Ukraine in 
October 1990.
The New Law on Religion
On October 1, 1990, the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Organizations by a vote of 341 against 2 rooms. This meant 
that the 1929 Law on Religion that had served for decades as the basis for the 
persecution of Christian believers was finally abolished. The new law was adopted after 
4
having been shuffled between different ministries over a period of two years. At the 
insistence of the Russian Orthodox Church, the following points were included in the 
final text:
• Atheism and religion to be treated on an equal basis;
• Status of a legal person for all religious communities and right to the possession of 
property;
• Right of religious education; and
• Foundation of religious publishing houses and publications.
Although there had also been a demand for optional religious instruction in schools, this 
right was not included in the law. However, since the USSR law can be supplemented 
by republican laws in the individual union republics, optional school instruction in 
religion remains possible. In the Western Ukraine and Georgia, such instruction is 
already being conducted in classrooms where the necessary teachers are available.
The new law represents a very substantial improvement in the situation of the church 
and ensures the continuation of the increased freedom that the churches have come to 
enjoy over the last two years.
Nevertheless, it must be made clear that despite the new legal basis, the situation of the 
churches in practice will depend on the fate of democratization in the Soviet Union. If, in 
particular the reintroduction of a dictatorial regime occurs under the aegis of Russian 
chauvinism, it is possible that some churches will be given unequal treatment compared 
with others. In the light of experience hitherto, it cannot be expected that the Russian 
Orthodox Church would protest vigorously against the persecution of other churches if it 
were to be granted a privileged position.
Notes:
1 Lenin, Collected Works (German edition), vol. 36, p. 195.
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2 Secret letter from Lenin to Politburo members, March 19,1922. 
3 Russkaya Mysl' (Paris), March 3, 1989.
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